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C R I M I N A L L AW
Can the Federal Government Use the Generic Wire Fraud Statute to
Prosecute Public Officials for Corrupt Activities That Are
Conducted for Political Rather than Private Gain?
CASE AT A GLANCE
The defendants, two former New Jersey officials convicted in “Bridgegate,” challenge the scope of
federal prosecutorial power under the generic wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343. They argue that
the government sidestepped the Court’s explicit prohibition on inquiries into an official’s real reasons
for an official act, unless bribery or kickbacks are involved. The defendants urge the Court to foreclose
the government from circumventing limitations on the honest-services fraud doctrine under McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), and Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010). The government
argues that the defendants’ actions met all statutory elements without the jury having to assess their
underlying political motives.

Kelly v. United States
Docket No. 18-1059
Argument Date: January 14, 2020
From: The Third Circuit
by Nora V. Demleitner
Washington and Lee University, VA

INTRODUCTION
Petitioner and the United States agree that lies may be decisive
in this case. How, why, and even which lies, however, are in
dispute. Petitioner presents the Court with a broad question
about the acceptability of the government’s parsing of motives
to obtain a conviction. The government, on the other hand, sets
out a workman-like question about whether it met the elements
of the offense. Even though petitioner appeals all counts of her
conviction, the argument centers largely on the wire fraud statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1343.

ISSUE
Does petitioner’s action of redirecting public resources meet the
requirements set out under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 that she exceeded her
authority and deprived the state of its property?

FACTS
The case arises from the 2013 New Jersey “Bridgegate” scandal.
At the time petitioner Bridget Anne Kelly worked as deputy chief
of staff for New Jersey’s Ofice of Intergovernmental Affairs and
was largely responsible for organizing local government oficials in
support of Governor Chris Christie. William E. Baroni Jr. served as
deputy executive director (ED) of the Port Authority, an interstate
governmental organization that oversees public transportation
between New York and New Jersey, including the George
Washington Bridge (GW). His chief of staff was David Wildstein.

12

Baroni, whose interests align with Kelly’s, joined the case as
respondent to not delay the brieing schedule.
Despite having been courted by Governor Christie, in June 2013
the mayor of Fort Lee, NJ, indicated that he would not support
Christie in his re-election bid. In response, Kelly informed
Wildstein and Baroni that it was “[t]ime for some trafic problems
in Fort Lee.”
The GW, the world’s busiest bridge, has 13 lanes and tollbooths
at the entrance ramp from Fort Lee; 3 booths are dedicated to
entry from Fort Lee. Kelly, Wildstein, and Baroni agreed that
Baroni, in his role as deputy ED, should reallocate two of the
three lanes from Fort Lee so as to be available for general use.
Since only one lane would be open to Fort Lee trafic, Baroni and
Wildstein authorized hiring a backup tollbooth operator to keep
the single lane open at all times. To justify the lane changes to
Port Authority staff, Wildstein invented a trafic study. Some staff
time was allocated to the phony study, and Port Authority staff
collected some data.
The reallocation was to go in effect on Monday, September
9, 2013, the irst day of the new school year. In contrast to
Port Authority operating procedures, Baroni and Wildstein
intentionally withheld information about the change from local
authorities and the Port Authority’s executive director, Patrick
Foye. Yet, both told Port Authority staff that Foye supported the
changes.
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Trafic in Fort Lee quickly ground to a halt that Monday, presenting
safety and security hazards. When the ED learned of the closure
later that week, he immediately reversed the lane realignment.
Once the political background to “Bridgegate” became apparent,
Governor Christie dismissed all three involved. He could never
shake the political stain either.
In 2015, Kelly and Baroni were charged with conspiracies to
commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349 and 1343 and federal
program fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 666(a)(1)(A), and
to violate civil rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241, the underlying
substantive crimes of wire fraud, federal program fraud, and
deprivation of civil rights under color of law, 18 U.S.C. § 242.
The government’s theory of the case was that defendants had
conspired to fraudulently use Port Authority resources and
property. Wildstein pled guilty to two counts and cooperated with
the government.
A jury convicted both defendants on all counts. The district court
originally sentenced Kelly to 18 months and Baroni to 24 months
in prison, each with one year of supervised release to follow. The
Third Circuit, 909 F.3d 550 (3rd Cir. 2018), petition for rehearing
denied (Feb. 5, 2019), vacated the civil rights convictions but
afirmed all other counts. At resentencing, the judge shortened
Kelly’s and Baroni’s prison terms by 5 and 6 months, respectively.
After the petition for rehearing was denied, Kelly iled for a writ
of certiorari. Baroni, who had not requested rehearing, iled
in support of Kelly’s brief. When the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, Baroni joined as respondent so that any decision the
Court renders will impact him directly.

CASE ANALYSIS
Petitioner argues that she was convicted of “an otherwiselegitimate oficial act” because she concealed her political
motive—to punish the mayor of Fort Lee for his refusal to
support the governor. The lower court decisions must be wrong
as they assessed the defendants’ true political reasons rather
than adhering to their stated policy grounds in violation of
Supreme Court precedent.

Petitioner and respondent also note that a narrow argument about
inal decision-makers is generally misleading as there is almost
never an ultimate authority. In addition, they point to the anomaly
that it would be the most powerful elected and appointed oficials
who would escape liability under the government’s approach.
In response, the United States notes that in most organizations,
the question of who has inal authority is clearly delineated. That
is not true for the Port Authority, which appears to operate without
written policies and procedures. The issue of whether Baroni
exercised ultimate decision-making authority was therefore
correctly left to the jury, which found against him. Based on the
evidence, which included Baroni and Wildstein lying about the
ED’s assent to the realignment and his immediate reversal of the
trafic change once he found out about it, a rational jury could ind
in the government’s favor.
Baroni’s pretense of the nonexistent trafic study was not at issue
legally but served to indicate his lack of ultimate authority. That
turned his action into “unauthorized commandeering of Port
Authority resources,” bringing it within purview of the fraud
statute, the government argues.
As to the second condition, petitioner argues the lower level courts
misconstrued the meaning of “property” under the fraud statute.
Two types of property are at issue though there is disagreement
as to which of these deinitions may be properly before the
Court. One is the lost wages of Port Authority staff recruited to
participate in the phony trafic study, Baroni and Wildstein’s time,
and the additional expense for the second tollbooth collector. The
Third Circuit based its decision largely on the lost labor of public
employees. The other deinitional question, merely lagged by the
Third Circuit, pertains to the Port Authority’s “right to control” the
exclusive operation of the GW.
Petitioner argues that since the underlying decision to realign
lanes was not fraudulent, it cannot amount to fraud to use
the resources to implement such decision. After all, the costs
attendant to the realignment were solely incidental and not the
object of the scheme to defraud.

Baroni argues that “Bridgegate is a case of bareknuckle New
Jersey politics, not graft,” for which all paid a political price. The
federal government’s prosecution here overreached. According
to Baroni, the government circumvented the Supreme Court’s
limitations on use of the “honest services” doctrine set out in
Skilling and McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).

Petitioner also claims that “intangible rights of allocation,
exclusion, and control” do not it the deinition of “property” under
the fraud statute. The Port Authority’s regulatory decision-making
power over the bridge is not a property interest but rather part of
a state’s sovereign power to regulate akin to the state licenses in
Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000).

The federal wire fraud statute requires three crucial elements
to be met. First, petitioner argues oficials empowered to make
decisions on behalf of the state may breach their iduciary duty
if using “bad” or deceitful reasons but do not incur criminal
liability. Since Baroni effectively represented the victim—the
Port Authority—he could not have deceived it even when his
given rationale was pretextual. The defendants argue Baroni was
authorized to act on behalf of the Port Authority without giving
any rationale. He and the ED each could issue decisions the other
could not override. Any lie about his true motive was therefore
irrelevant.

The government notes Kelly and Baroni procured the labor of
public employees, which included both staff and Baroni and
Wildstein’s time, under false or fraudulent pretenses. Because
they deprived the Port Authority of its money, the Third Circuit
did not need to decide whether they also ran afoul of the “right to
control,” though the court found suficient evidence to that effect.
As the lanes and tollbooths on the GW generate revenue, the
Port Authority has not only a purely regulatory but also property
interests in the exclusive operation of the bridge.
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The third condition, in fraud, a lie is only actionable if it pertains
to the essential terms of a transaction that deprive a party of the
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beneit of the bargain. According to petitioner, a motive for an
action is not an essential part of the bargain. Any discussion about
the defendant’s motive therefore threatens to criminalize politics.
After all, in fraud statutes the alleged offender’s objective decision
rather than their subjective motive is at issue.
The cover story about the trafic study, the government claims, was
a “material” falsehood because reasonable persons would attach
importance to it in determining their action. Baroni could only
accomplish “by trick” the object of the scheme—control over the
bridge and employee time and labor. Without that false statement,
he would have never been able to commandeer Port Authority
resources.
The government notes that the underlying political motive was not
at issue in determining whether an offense occurred. It was raised
at trial only to provide the jury with a coherent explanation as to
why the offense occurred at all.
Petitioner charges the government with contravening the Supreme
Court’s carefully constructed limitations on the “honest services”
doctrine, as set out in McNally, Skilling, and McDonnell. Honest
services fraud is limited to bribery or kickbacks where an oficial
action furthers undisclosed personal interests while purporting
to advance a public interest. If the wire fraud statute were applied
as the government proposes, Baroni argues, it would thwart the
limitations the Court imposed on the “honest services” doctrine.
In contravention of precedent, the United States uses federal
fraud statutes to set out good government requirements for local
oficials. That raises serious questions of federalism. In addition,
the government’s theory criminalizes a wide range of political
activity not only in local but also in national politics whenever
questions of motive are raised. These issues should be resolved
at the ballot box rather than in the courtroom, the Court noted in
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
The government rejects the notion that this is an honest services
fraud case in disguise but rather that it simply involved money and
property fraud. Kelly and Baroni’s political motive was ultimately
irrelevant; only their mens rea mattered. The material lies at issue
did not pertain to the goal of the lane realignment but rather to the
existence of the trafic study. It was that lie that allowed Baroni to
misappropriate Port Authority resources.
The contravention of the Supreme Court’s mandate is not the only
objectionable feature of the government’s approach, according to
petitioner and respondent. The government’s theory of the case
also violates every canon of construction. Its parsing of an oficial’s
true motive will cast a pall over every local government decision
and will allow federal prosecutors to become roving ambassadors
of good government, leaving in their wake countless random and
perhaps partisan-based criminal convictions. Baroni states that
such interpretation of the statute “injects a potent new weapon
into a highly charged, hyper-partisan political environment in
which voices on both sides are already regularly clamoring for
their rivals to be prosecuted.” The vagueness of the statute allows
prosecutors and judges, rather than the legislature, to deine
crimes and will lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
It raises fair notice concerns and at a minimum demands
application of the doctrine of lenity.
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Three amici weigh in on Kelly’s side. Lord Conrad Black and
Governor Robert F. McDonnell, who both saw the Supreme Court
overturn their convictions, consider the government’s action
an end run around the limitations imposed in their cases and a
testament to governmental overreach facilitated by the vast array
of federal criminal statutes.
Two other amici weigh in on the control theory and the property
deinition, respectively. The National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers argues that neither state government functions
nor regulatory actions can be “property” for purposes of the wire
fraud statute without nullifying the Supreme Court’s decision in
Cleveland. If the government is permitted to consider the right
to regulate trafic on the GW Bridge as property, that statute will
become unbounded.
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse iles the sole amicus brief on behalf
of the government, asking the Court essentially to stay out of
the political process and respect the jury’s verdict to prevent the
further corruption of the political process.

SIGNIFICANCE
Petitioner and respondent style this case as the next chapter
in the line of decisions from McNally to McDonnell that reign
in governmental prosecutions in cases of public (and private)
“corruption.” Accordingly, they charge the government with
prosecutorial overreach, with subverting the Court’s prior
limitations, and with the criminalization of merely political
actions. The government attempts to dial down the stakes.
The full facts raise questions as to whether this case presents
the correct vehicle for further restriction on public corruption
prosecutions. Petitioner and respondent win the competition of
rhetorical lourish and memorable lines, but two of the pivotal
questions—Baroni’s authority and the status of the trafic study—
seem to have been allocated correctly to the jury, with the evidence
adduced meeting at least a suficiency standard.
Despite the facts’ shortcomings and the government’s attempt to
avoid a broad ruling, most commentators expect the Court to use
the case as an opportunity to further limit federal prosecutions
of local oficials in cases involving corrupt conduct that does not
directly beneit the involved inancially. That may serve well those
who fear the breadth of criminal statutes and federal prosecutions.
The concept of “property” the United States proposes might
provide the easiest hook, especially as the government cites
Baroni and Wildstein’s time expended in the plot as basis for the
loss involved.
One can safely assume that the defendants here never expected
a criminal prosecution, which raises notice concerns. Still, the
stakes and the actions seem qualitatively different from those in
the earlier cases petitioner cites.
In the end, Senator Whitehouse’s amicus brief may have hit
a nerve in his invocation of jury sensibilities to actionable
“corruption.” Still it is upon Congress to draft statutes that provide
notice and bounded deinitions of criminality.
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AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Petitioner Bridget Anne Kelly
Lord Conrad Black and Former Governor Robert F. McDonnell
(Ryan Joseph Walsh, 312.660.7600)
Michael Binday (David William Shapiro, 510.906.4906)
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (Joshua Lewis
Dratel, 212.732.0707)
In Support of Respondent United States
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (Michael Dominic Meuti,
216.363.6246)

For Petitioner Bridget Anne Kelly (Yaakov Moshe Roth,
202.879.3939)
For Respondent William Baroni (Michael Alexander Levy,
212.839.7341)
For Respondent United States (Jeffrey Bryan Wall, Acting Solicitor
General, 202.514.2217)
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